SUPREME TUBE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, 2016 PTD-LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE 2058 (2016)

(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----

----Ss.2(14) & 2(20)----'Input tax'/'output tax'----Meaning and scope---Input tax, as defined in S. 2 (14) of Sales Tax, 1990, is a tax levied under the Act on the supply of goods to the persons, which means that input tax is paid by the registered person on purchase of goods in the course of or in furtherance of his business---Sales tax being a value added tax, the input tax is the value added to the price of the goods purchased by the registered person---Output tax, on the other hand, as defined in S. 2 (20) of Act, is the tax levied under the Act on supply of goods, made by the person, thus, the tax is levied on the sale of goods made by the registered person during the course of or in furtherance of his business, and the same is the value added to the price of the goods sold by the registered person---Taxable supplies are, therefore, subject to sales tax when the same are bought and sold in the course of business, through different transactions, executed by the registered person---Levy of tax is an ongoing process in a series of transactions where every registered person in the supply chain pays sales tax---Difference between the sales tax paid at the time of purchase (input tax) and the tax paid at the time of sale (output tax) is the amount chargeable to sales tax under Sales Tax Act, 1990.

(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----

----Ss. 3, 7, 8, 8B & 73----Scope of tax---Determination of tax liability---Tax credited not allowed---Adjustable input tax---Certain transactions not admissible---Scope---Section 3 of the Act levies sales tax and S.7 subject to Ss. 8 & 8 B of the Act determines the tax liability---Section 7(1) of the Act makes the registered person entitled to deduct input tax from output tax for the purpose of determining its tax liability---Section 7(2) of the Act mandates the requirement, on the basis of which the entitlement of the registered person to claim adjustment would be made---Section 73 of the Act imposes a further condition requiring the registered person to make all payments through proper banking channel in order to claim input tax adjustment---Section 8 of the Act relates to tax credit and sets out when the registered person will not be entitled to claim adjustment of input tax---Section 8 B of the Act restricts the adjustments of input tax in a tax period to 90%.

(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----

----Ss.7 & 8 B----Determination of tax liability---Adjustable input tax---Basic right to seek input tax adjustment is provided for in S. 7 of the Act, which determines the tax liability of the registered person---Entitlement of the registered person for adjustment of input tax is based on documented record or invoices pertaining to the purchases and sales made during a tax period; hence, the adjustment claimed and its admissibility has to be assessed by the authorities to establish the tax liability---Section 8 B of the Act does not grant the right to claim adjustment, as the same only quantifies the extent of the adjustment which would be allowed in a tax period.

(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----

----S. 8 B----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 23---Adjustable input tax---Constitutionality---'Unreasonable restriction', principle of---Applicability---Fundamental right as to provision of property---Petitioners challenged the show cause notice, which provided that the petitioner had claimed excessive input tax adjustments for amounts which were not admissible as per S. 7 read with Ss. 8 & 8 B of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Petitioners also challenged the vires of S. 8 B of the Act on ground that the provisions of the section, being confiscatory, were ultra vires the provisions of Art. 23 of the Constitution, as the department granted input tax adjustment up to 90% of the output tax for every tax period and retained 10% of the adjustable amount to be carried forward each month, and consequently, at the end of each year, any amount pending on account of that 10% was refunded to the petitioners on their application---Petitioners contended that retention of the 10% adjustable amount each accumulated into large amounts of money at the end of each tax years, and thus, the petitioners were deprived of their money throughout each tax year, which they would otherwise invest into their business to prevent financial constraints, and that retention of 10% adjustable amount fell within the ambit of unreasonable restriction on their right to input tax adjustment as guaranteed under Art. 23 of the Constitution---Validity---Fact that S. 8B of SalesTax Act, 1990 allowed the department to retain 10% of the adjustable amount meant that the department was confiscating the property of the petitioners resulting in unjust enrichment---Petitioners, in the present case, however, had not shown that what amounts they were entitled to, which had been retained by the department for each month, nor had any of them, except one petitioner, quantified their proprietary right, that was being confiscated---Petitioners, without demonstrating the actual confiscation and deprivation, had challenged the vires of S. 8 B of the Act---Legislature, in its wisdom, had legislated S. 8 B of Act for the efficacious fulfillment of the objects and purposes of Sales Tax Act, 1990---In determining reasonableness of the restriction imposed under the law, the Court must bear in mind the competing interest so as to serve the public purpose---Basic purpose of S. 8B of the Act was to recover tax and to encourage the taxpayers to document its transactions, so that a tax activity could be charged with the required tax---Section 8 B of the Act, therefore, had a rational nexus with the purpose of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and with the scheme thereof, which required adjustment of input tax to determine the tax liability and a refund of excessive amounts to the registered persons---Petitioner had failed to establish infringement of any fundamental right; therefore, question of proportionality did not arise---Restriction imposed in terms S. 8 B of the Act was reasonable, and as such, the same did not deprive the registered persons of any property or amounts due to them---Clear violation of a fundamental right must be evident when a law was challenged---Cases in hand had been built on conjectures and presumptions, as no particulars or financial implications had been provided---Petitioners were obliged to show as to how their proprietary right was being infringed and what amounts they were entitled to for the purposes of input tax adjustment; without the same, strong presumption of constitutionality, legality and reasonableness was attached to S. 8 B of the Act---Petitioner should have filed their respective replies to the impugned show cause notices to show that they had not claimed any excessive adjustment---Constitutional petition could not be filed against a show cause notice, since only a notice had been served, for which a reply must be submitted---Case of one of the petitioners, who showed that some amounts due to him from the audited accounts, being a case of personal hardship, did not justify a challenge to the constitutionality of S.8B of the Act---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. through Chief Financial Officer v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and 3 others PLD 2013 Lah. 693 and Muhammad Nasir Mahmood and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, Islamabad PLD 2009 SC 107 ref.

All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 Sindh 129; Mst. Ummatull ah through Attorney v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, Karachi and 6 others PLD 2010 Kar. 236 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq and others 2007 CLD 1 = 2007 PTD 67 rel.

Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Hashim Aslam Butt, Naveed Zafar Khan, Zahid Ateeq Chaudhary, H. M. Majid Siddiqui, Javed Iqbal Qazi, M.M. Akram, Muhammad Nauman Yahya, Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Abdul Waheed Habib, Sami Ullah Zia, Muhammad Amir Qadeer, Muhammad Shahid Baig, Muhammad Rehman and Muhammad Asif Rana for Petitioners

Muhammad Zikria Sheikh, DAG and Muzammil Akhtar Shabbir, DA G. for Respondents

Muhammad Yahya Johar for Respondent FBR/Commissioner.

Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Muqtedir Akhtar Shabbir, Ch. Imtiaz Ali, Ibrar Ahmad, Ahmad Hassan Khan, Imran Rasool, Kunwar Riaz Ahmad Khan, Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Ehsan ur Rehman Sheikh, Saeed ur Rehman Dogar, Liaqat Ali Chaudhary, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Mian Qamar-ud-Din, Muhammad Asif Hashmi, Raza Ashfaq Sheikh, Secretary (IR) Operations, FBR. Zulqarnain Tirmazi, Commissioner Zone-I, LTU for Inland Revenue.

Dates of Hearing: 4th, 11th December, 2015, 27th January, 10th and 16th March, 2016.

JUDGMENT

AYESHA A. MALIK J.---This common judgment decides upon the issues raised in the Writ Petitions detailed in Schedules "A" and "B", appended with the judgment, as all Petitions challenge the vires of Section 8B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("Act") and raise common questions of law and facts.

2.Petitions mentioned in Schedule "A", challenge the vires of Section 8B of the Act on the ground that it is in violation of Article 23 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution") being confiscatory in nature as it restricts adjustment of input tax to 90% of the output tax and the remaining 10% of the adjustable amount is illegally retained by the Respondents and carried forward into the next tax period. Petitions detailed in Schedule "B" in addition to the challenge to the vires of Section 8B of the Act, have impugned show cause notices calling for an explanation from the Petitioners with respect to adjustment of input tax in excess of the 90% of the output tax.

3.The Petitioners before the Court are involved in various sectors of business such as the chemical industry, plastic industry, polypropylene industry and the textile industry. Some are involved in the manufacturing business of steel pipes and of foot wear. It is the case of all the Petitioners that Section 8B of the Act, promulgated through the Finance Act, 2007, is illegal and unconstitutional as the Respondents grant input tax adjustment up to 90% of the output tax for every tax period and retain 10% of the adjustable amount, which amount should be refunded to the Petitioners. This 10% of the adjustable amount is carried forward in each tax period that is every month and ultimately at the end of the year, any amount pending is refunded to the Petitioners on an application seeking refund. Learned counsel for the Petitioners argued that the provisions of Section 8B of the Act are confiscatory in nature as the FBR retains the 10% adjustable amount which they are not entitled to. This amount belongs to the Petitioners and is the property of the Petitioners. Since the Petitioners are deprived of their property it causes great financial hardship to the Petitioners as the money can be invested in the business and will prevent financial pressure on the business. Learned counsel explained that on account of the 10% adjustable amount retained by the Respondents a certain portion of input tax adjustment is carried forward each month and consequently large amounts are retained by the Respondents over the year which is then refunded to the Petitioners at the end of the tax year. They argued that this amounts to unjust enrichment and is an unreasonable restriction imposed on the registered person. They also argued that it is confiscatory in nature and violative of Article 23 of the Constitution as they are deprived of their property. Learned counsel explained that under the previous regime, the Petitioners were given 100% tax adjustment for each tax period and certain businesses were excluded from the ambit of Section 8B under SRO No.644(1)/2007 dated 27.6.2007. Learned counsel argued that several efforts have been made to resolve this issue by the Respondents, however, no positive response was given to the Petitioners, hence the instant Petitions have been filed.

4.This Court vide order dated 5.11.2015 issued notice to the learned Attorney General for Pakistan under Order XXVII-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and also directed to file report and parawise comments on behalf of the Respondent Federation. Whereupon the Respondent Federation has filed report and parawise comments. Parawise comments have also been filed on behalf of the Respondent FBR. Today Raza Ashfaq Sheikh, Secretary (IR) Operations, FBR and Zulqarnain Tirmazi, Commissioner Zone-I, LTU, Lahore have appeared before the Court on behalf of the Respondents to assist the Court.

5.The Federal Government in its report and parawise comments and in response to the notice under Order XXVII-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 has stated that they will rely upon the reply filed by the Respondent FBR for the purposes of defending the law and explaining the intent of Section 8B of the Act. Raza Ashfaq Sheikh, Secretary (IR) Operations, FBR and Zulqarnain Tirmazi, Commissioner Zone-I, LTU, Lahore present before this Court have filed their written reply in which they have explained the intent and working of the law.

6.In terms of what has been argued on behalf of the Respondents the purpose of Section 8B of the Act is to collect the tax due and encourage correct declaration of taxable supplies by registered persons. This in turn discourages misdeclaration which has become a serious problem for the FBR and hampers the collection of tax. By retaining 10% of the adjustable amount for each tax period, the registered person is compelled to file proper documents to get its refund. It is their case that lack of proper documents in the business of the registered persons allows a registered person to claim 100% refund of amounts it is not entitled to. The Respondents have to wait until an audit is conducted or inquiry is made before it can recover excessive amounts claimed by the registered person under the garb of input tax adjustment. It is their case that Section 8B of the Act ensures that the liability to pay sales tax is satisfied and the registered person is encouraged to document its sales and purchases. It is the FBR's experience that when a registered person claims a refund in each tax period it is based on misdeclarations and the State is deprived of the tax it is entitled to collect under the Act. Section 8B of the Act has assured that this practice be abandoned. The data from 2007 onwards shows that frivolous refund claims have reduced substantially. They also argued that no loss is caused to any of the Petitioners and there is no case before the Court where the adjustable 10% is retained throughout the year such that it could be labeled as causing financial loss to the Petitioners. To the contrary the practice of misdeclaration is being checked and controlled and sales tax is recovered. Learned counsel have also argued that in case there is individual hardship, it cannot become a ground to challenge the vires of the law or urge deprivation. It is their case that the question of refund under Section 8B of the Act is a concession granted to the registered person which cannot be claimed as of right. The legislature in its wisdom required that the law ensure that tax was duly paid and by virtue of a refund application the registered person should not avoid payment of tax due. In any event, if at all any amounts are carried forward in a month it will be refunded to the registered person in the next tax period. It has also been argued that there is a presumption in favour of the law of its constitutionality and the scheme of law is not confiscatory. Both the officers have categorically stated that there is no case where 10% of the adjustable amount is carried forward each month, ultimately resulting in a major refund at the end of the year.

7.The basic issue raised in the Petitions is the vires of Section 8B of the Act, which reads as follows:

"8B Adjustable input tax.---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in relation to a tax period, a registered person shall not be allowed to adjust input tax in excess of ninety per cent of the output tax for that tax period:

[Provided that the restriction on the adjustment of input tax in excess of ninety per cent of the output tax, shall not apply in case of fixed assets or capital goods:]

Provided further that that the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, exclude any person or class of persons from the purview of subsection (1).

(2)A registered person, subject to subsection (1), may be allowed adjustment [or refund] of input tax not allowed under sub-section (1) subject to the following conditions, namely:-

(i)In the case of registered persons, whose accounts are subject to audit under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, upon furnishing a statement along with annual audited accounts, duly certified by the auditors, showing value additions less than the limit prescribed under sub section (1) above; or

(ii)In case of other registered persons, subject to the conditions and restrictions as may be specified by the Board by notification in the official Gazette.

(3)The adjustment or refund of input tax mentioned in sub-section (2), if any, shall be made on yearly basis in the second month following the end of the financial year of the registered person.

(4)Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) and (2), the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, prescribe any other limit of input tax adjustment for any person or class of persons.

(5)Any auditor found guilty of misconduct in furnishing the certificate mentioned in subsection (2) shall be referred to the Council for disciplinary action under section 20D of Chartered Accountants, Ordinance, 1961( X of 1961)].

In order to appreciate the case of the Petitioners it is necessary to understand the meaning of input tax and output tax in the context of Section 8B of the Act. Input tax as defined in Section 2(14) of the Act is tax levied under the Act on the supply of goods to the person, meaning that it is sales tax paid by the registered person on the purchase of goods in the course of or in furtherance of its business. Since sales tax is a value added tax, input tax is the value added to the price of the goods purchased by the registered person. Output tax as defined in Section 2(20) of the Act is the tax levied under the Act on a supply of goods, made by the person so it is the tax levied on the sale of goods made by the registered person during the course of or in furtherance of its business. It is the value added to the price of the goods sold by the registered person. In this way taxable supplies are subject to sales tax when they are bought and sold in the course of business, through different transactions, executed by registered persons. It is an ongoing process in a series of transactions where every registered person in the supply chain pays sales tax. The difference between the sales tax paid at the time of purchase (input tax) and the tax paid at the time of sale (output tax) is the amount chargeable to sales tax under the Act. While Section 3 levies sales tax, Section 7 of the Act, subject to Sections 8 and 8B, determines the tax liability. In terms of Section 7(1) the registered person is entitled to deduct input tax from output tax for the purpose of determining its tax liability. Section 7(2) of the Act mandates the requirements on the basis of which the entitlement of the registered person to claim adjustment shall be made. Section 73 of the Act imposes a further condition requiring the registered person to make all payments through proper banking channel in order to claim input tax adjustment. In this way the registered person files its tax returns and claims refund under Section 7 of the Act. The application is processed and the refund claim is decided upon by the competent person. Section 8 relates to tax credit and sets out when the registered person shall not be entitled to claim adjustment of input tax and Section 8B restricts the adjustment of input tax in a tax period to 90%.

8.The Petitioners case is that once they have satisfied the requirements of Section 7 read with Section 8 of the Act and established their entitlement for input tax adjustment they have a proprietary right under Article 23 of the Constitution to receive the refund amount. The fact that Section 8B of the Act allows the Respondents to retain 10% of the adjustable amount means that the Respondents are confiscating the property of the Petitioners resulting in unjust enrichment. In support of this argument interestingly the Petitioner in WP No.3479/2013 is the only Petitioner who has relied upon its audited accounts to show that some amounts are due to it from the Respondents in the form of a refund under Section 8B of the Act. No other Petitioner has shown what amounts it is entitled to, which are retained by the Respondents each month, nor has any Petitioner quantified the proprietary right that is being confiscated. Without demonstrating the actual confiscation and deprivation of property the Petitioners have challenged the vires of the law on the ground that their right to property under Article 23 is denied by Section 8B of the Act. Furthermore, the Petitions mentioned in Schedule "B? have challenged show cause notices wherein it is alleged that they have claimed excessive input tax adjustment for amounts they were not entitled to and which amounts were not admissible as per Section 7 read with Sections 8 and 8B of the Act. Even these Petitioners have not shown through any document how the law is confiscatory and which amounts they are entitled to which are carried forward under the 10% adjustable amount which is retained by the Respondents. With reference to these Petitioners since it is just a show cause notice, the Petitioners should have filed their respective replies to show that they have not claimed excessive adjustment. In this regard it is settled law that a constitutional petition cannot be filed against a show cause notice since only a notice has been served for which a reply must be submitted. Even otherwise it has been held in the case titled All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 129) that a heavy burden is cast on a person challenging the validity or vires of any law. A clear violation of a fundamental right must be evident when challenging the law. This burden has not been discharged by the Petitioners before the Court as they have not shown what amounts have been confiscated or what amounts they were entitled to under Section 7 which has been retained consequent to the 10% restriction under Section 8B of the Act. It appears that the all the cases are built on conjectures and presumptions as no particulars or financial implications have been provided. The Petitioners were obligated to show how their proprietary right is being infringed and what amounts they are entitled to for the purposes of input tax adjustment. Without the same, a strong presumption of constitutionality, legality and reasonableness is attached to Section 8B of the Act. An onerous burden is cast on the Petitioners, who have to show that their fundamental right has actually been infringed. Reliance is placed on the case titled Mst. Ummatull ah through Attorney v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, Karachi and 6 others (PLD 2010 Karachi 236).

9.The other argument of the Petitioners is that retaining the 10% adjustable amount is an unreasonable restriction on the right to input tax adjustment. Even though I have already held that the Petitioners have failed to make out their case that the Respondents have retained 10% of the adjustable amount the argument of reasonable restriction must be seen. The basic right to seek input tax adjustment is provided for in Section 7 of the Act which determines the tax liability of the registered person. The entitlement of the registered person for adjustment of input tax is based on documented record or invoices pertaining to the purchases and sales made during a tax period. Hence the adjustment claimed and its admissibility have to be assessed by the authorities to establish the tax liability. Section 8B of the Act does not grant the right to claim adjustment. It only quantifies the extent of the adjustment which will be allowed in a tax period. Hence the Petitioners argued that it places an unreasonable restriction on their proprietary right guaranteed under Article 23 of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed on the cases titled D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. through Chief Financial Officer v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and 3 others (PLD 2013 Lahore 693) and Muhammad Nasir Mahmood and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, Islamabad (PLD 2009 SC 107). The question which needs to be answered is whether the restriction of 90% is an unreasonable restriction on the right to the adjustable amount.

10.The right to claim adjustment under Section 7 has been made subject to Section 8B of the Act. This means that any entitlement under section 7 will be refunded up to 90% and 10% of the adjustable amount will be carried forward into the next month. The Petitioners have relied upon PLD 2013 Lahore 693 (supra) which has deliberated on the term reasonable restriction and finds that the law on reasonable restriction must uphold the constitutional theme of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, social justice and advance the principles of policy. It finds that where the vires of law are challenged the Court must examine the right and the restriction imposed and thereafter determine if the restriction is necessary and proportionate, has a proper purpose and a rational connection to the underlying act. In the case cited at PLD 2009 SC 107 (supra) it was held that a reasonable restriction cannot arbitrarily or excessively invade the fundamental right. That the law cannot be arbitrary, excessive or beyond what is required in the public interest. In this regard Raza Ashfaq Sheikh, Secretary (IR) Operations, FBR and Zulqarnain Tirmazi, Commissioner Zone-I, LTU, Lahore have categorically stated that the biggest problem in the way of recovering sales tax is the lack of documentation. They explained that the sales tax regime is based on self assessment hence without proper documentation and whilst relying on fake invoices and seeking adjustment on inadmissible amounts registered persons are able to claim excessive amounts which hampers the recovery of tax. Section 8B of the Act was legislated to ensure refund of admissible claims of input tax. The refund is given up to 90% allowing the registered person to claim refund of 10% in the next tax period so that the registered person is discouraged from claiming excessive adjustment. In order to recover input tax adjustment amounts the registered person claims amount which are due to it which means that the 10% restriction discourages wrong claims. They also stated that in most cases the adjustable amount is fully paid within two successive tax periods meaning that if there is a 10% adjustment it is fully recovered in the next tax period. Hence the wisdom of the legislature was to ensure recovery of the sales tax, such that the restriction is in furtherance of the objective of the Act that is to recover sales tax. I have already held that the Petitioners have failed to establish that any fundamental right has been infringed therefore the question of proportionality does not arise. It is the case of the Respondents that the 90% restriction was required to ensure that the tax is collected and the registered person documents its transactions so as to reduce misdeclarations and fake invoicing. In terms of what has been stated, it was a policy decision of the Legislature to impose a restriction to ensure that the tax is recovered. This restriction is reasonable and as such does not deprive the registered person of any property or amounts due to it. It has been held in the case titled Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq and others (2007 CLD 1 = 2007 PTD 67) by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan that the only consideration for a Court, when a statute is challenged, is whether the legislation under challenge is permissible under the Constitution. Reasonableness or otherwise is a matter of legislative policy and it is not for the Courts to adjudicate on the policy. It has also been held in this case that when a Court interprets fiscal statutes and laws relating to economic activities, the judicial approach should be to give the legislatures maximum flexibility to fulfill its purpose. In these cases although the Petitioners have challenged the vires of Section 8B of the Act on the ground that it deprives them of their fundamental right to property under Article 23 of the Constitution, they have failed to show what property they have been deprived of by way of Section 8B of the Act. They have also not been able to convince this Court that the objective of recovering and collecting tax through Section 8B imposes an unreasonable restriction on any proprietary rights of the Petitioners. The legislature in its wisdom legislated Section 86 of the Act for the efficacious fulfilment of the objects and purposes of the Act. In determining reasonableness of the restriction imposed under the law the Court must bear in mind the competing interests so as to serve the public purpose. The basic purpose is to recover the tax and to encourage the tax payer to document its transactions so that the taxable activity can be charged the required tax. Section 8B of the Act therefore has a rational nexus with the purpose of Act and with the scheme of the Act which requires adjustment of input tax to determine the tax liability and a refund of excessive amounts to the registered person. In terms of the mechanism provided under Section 7 of the Act, the Petitioners have not been able to show that when practically applying Section 8B of the Act, they have claimed amounts pending with the Respondents which they are entitled to. So far as the Petitioner in W.P. No.3479/2013 it has shown some amounts due to it from the audited accounts. However, if any amounts are due to it, then this amounts to a case of personal hardship and does not justify a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8B of the Act.

11. In view of the aforesaid, no case for interference is made out. All the Petitions are dismissed.

SL/S-53/LPetitions dismissed.