CHIEF AUTO CENTRE (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE VS COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS, ADJUDICATION-I, KARACHI, 2018 PTD-CUSTOMS-APPELLATE-TRIBUNAL-LAHORE 1705 (2017)

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss.194-A & 195-B---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Maintainability---Appeal was objected to, contending that same could not be heard for decision, unless the imposed fine and penalty was paid by the appellant as expressed in S.195-B of the Customs Act, 1969---Validity---Section 195-B of the Customs Act, 1969, being directory and permissive in nature, appeal could not be dismissed on the basis of non-deposit of imposed fine/penalty---Section 195-B of the Customs Act, 1969, while directing the deposit of amount of duty in respect of goods, which were not under the control of Customs Authority or any penalty levied under that Act, though had used expression "shall", but no consequences followed in the expression for non-compliance---Section 195-B of the Customs Act, 1969 was deemed to be directory and not mandatory.

S.M. Naqi son of Syed Muhammad Hussain, Karachi v. Collector of Customs (Adj-I) and others (Customs Reference No.157 of 2008); PLD 1972 SC 326; Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Rakib PLD 1974 SC 134; 1993 MLD 1645, 1993 CLC 1405 and 2005 PTD (Trib.) 731 ref.

(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 181---SRO No.499(I)/2009 dated 13.6.2009---Imposition of redemption fine---Adjudicating authority, for the purpose of imposition of redemption fine, had resorted to application of SRO No.499(I)/2009, dated 13.6.2009 despite there being no allegation as to the import being violative of S.15 or a notification issued under S.16 of the Customs Act, 1969, or any other law for the time being in force, which requirements clearly had the mandate of the provisos to S.181 of the Customs Act, 1969---Such recourse had been adopted by the adjudicating authority, without there being any allegation in such regard, either narrated in the show-cause notice or in the order-in-original---Adjudicating authority had also unlawfully fixed the amount of the redemption fine to the extent of 35% of the value of the offending goods, inspite of the fact that customs value, was to be worked out with reference to the amount of duty/taxes attempted to be evaded and not the value of the offending goods---Manner in which the redemption fine had been imposed, simply militated against the settled principles of law and was neither warranted nor sustainable under the law.

Weave & Knit (Pvt.) Limited's case 2004 PTD 2981 and Novo Nordisk Pharma's case 2013 PTD (Trib.) 2186 ref.

(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss.32, 80, 83, 168 & 186---SRO No. 371(I)/2002, dated 15-6-2002---SRO No. 486(I)/2007, dated 9-6-2007---Mis-declaration---Evasion of duty and taxes---Seizure or detention of goods---After examination of goods, authorities, in exercise of powers vested upon them, through SRO No.371(I)/2002, dated 15-6-2002 passed valid assessment/ clearance orders, meaning thereby, the goods were out of charge of the customs---Said goods could not be detained or seized by either Director General of Intelligence and Investigation, or for the purpose of examination and assessment or even classification; as nothing of that sort was permissible, as after the goods were out of charge of Customs Officials they would become functus officio---Even otherwise, powers of valuation, classification and assessment, were not available to the said Directorate under SRO No.486(I)/2007, dated 9-6-2007---In case of apprehension of evasion of duty and taxes, the appropriate course available with Directorate was to file appeal under S.193 of the Customs Act, 1969 against the assessment orders passed under S.80 of the Customs Act, 1969, incorporating the apprehension and facts of the case and the controverting provisions of the Act/Rules---Directorate had also charged the appellants/importers for mis-declaration under the provision of S. 32(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, in absence of availability of collusion, without any basis---Appeal was allowed, holding that the subject goods, in terms of description, were to be assessed as per importers' declaration---Impugned order-in-original and the show-cause notice, were set aside.

2002 SCMR 312; 2009 PTD 1507 and 2005 SCMR 492 ref.

Asim Munir Bajwa for Appellants.

Muhammad Sadiq, I.O. and Saud-ul-Hassan, Investigating Officer present for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 11th April, 2017.

JUDGMENT

TAHIR ZIA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL-II).---Through this common order, I intend to dispose off four (04) Appeals bearing Nos.K-1224, 1223/2016, K-1226 and 1225/2016 directed against Order-in-Original Nos. 664/2015-16 and 665/2015-2016 dated 20.04.2016 passed by Additional Collector of Customs, Adjudication-I, Customs House, Karachi.

2.Since, these 04 appeals are based on similar facts and questions of law, therefore, it is needless to reproduce facts of each case separately. Hence, being heard and dealt with and disposed off simultaneously though this common order in the light of the judgment of the Honorable High Court of Sindh in Customs Reference No. 157 of 2008, S.M. Naqi son of Syed Muhammad Hussain v. Collector of Customs (Adj-I) and others. For reference the facts of Appeal No.K-1224/2016 as reported by the Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-Customs, Enforcement, Karachi (here-in-after to be referred as respondent No. 2), M/s. Chief Auto Centre (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore (here-in-after as Appellant No. 1) imported a consignment machinery/excavator parts stuffed in 1 x 40" container. Upon receipt of import documents delivered those to his clearing agent M/s. Haris Enterprises, Karachi (here-in-after as Appellant No. 2) for transmitting Goods Declaration under the provision of section 79(1) of the Customs Act, 1969 and Rule 433 of Sub-Chapter III of Chapter XXI of Customs Rules, 2001 with the MCC of Appraisement-West, which he did and as per pre-requisite deposited upfront duty and taxes, consequent to which GD was numbered as KAPW-HC-62483 dated 08.10.2015. Upon appearance of Goods Declaration, the nominated Appraiser instead of completing the assessment on the basis of the declaration and scanned documents, opted to get the goods examined under Section 198 of the Act and Rule 435 of the Rules. He while adducing his opinion transmitted the GD to the Deputy Collector of the Group, who gave his assent and transmitted the GD to the Deputy Collector KICT, who marked that to the examiner for conduction of physical examination of the imported goods for determination of actual description, quantity and quality. The examiner concerned carried out the examination and found the goods in accordance with the declaration and report so prepared was posted by him in the reservoir of the Goods Declaration. The nominated Appraiser upon appearance of report on his desktop, completed the assessment and passed assessment order under Section 80 of the Act and Rule 438 of the Rules and transmitted view message for payment of additional amount of duty and taxes, which was deposited by the appellant No. 2 after obtaining pay order from appellant No. 1, consequent to which the inbuilt authority of the WeBOC passed Clearance Order in terms of Section 83 of the Act and Rule 442 of the Rules. Immediately, after passing of Clearance Order, the officials of respondent No. 2 blocked the delivery and thereafter detained the goods on the plea that the assessment order so passed is erroneous being passed on the basis of declaration and examination report, scanned documents/catalogues upon receipt of view message under Rule 437 of the Rules, which is contrary to the actual description and classification of the goods. The official of respondent No. 2 subsequently examined the goods, which transpired that the appellant No. 1 in active connivance of appellant No. 2 has obtained clearance of auto parts of trucks in the garb of machinery and excavator parts, which are poles apart from each other auto parts falls under PCT 8409.9910 as against declared and assessed 8409.9999 and 8483.6099, this resulted in loss of Rs. 2,444,889.00 and the act of the appellant's falls within the ambit of section 32(1) and (2) sections 3, 4, 6, 33 and 34 of the Sales Tax , 1990 and section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, punishable under clause (14) of section 156(1) and aforesaid Sections of the Sales Tax and Income Tax. As a result of the said finding, the official of respondent No. 2 seized the goods under section 168(1) of the Act and a notice under section 171 was also served upon the appellants. The appellant No. 1 sensing the gravity of the issue filed a Constitution Petition in the High Court of Sindh, which ordered release of the goods after depositing pay order of the amount of revenue loss and post dated cheques against the anticipated imposed fine and penalty. In compliance of the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh after securing the pay order and post dated cheques, the respondent No. 2 ordered MCC of Appraisement-West to release the consignment. Which in the presence of passed assessment order under section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969 piled upon it yet another order passed under section 81 of the Act and the goods were delivered to the appellant No. 1. Thereafter, the officials of respondent No. 2 prepared contravention report and forwarded that to Collector of Customs, Adjudication-I, who referred to the competent authority defined in section 179 of the Act. In consideration of the contravention report, the Additional Collector of Customs, Adjudication-I, issued show-cause notice dated 23.11.2015 containing the facts and the contravening provision of the Act/Ordinance as were reported in the contravention report. The appellant No. 1 replied the show-cause notice, which failed to impress the subordinate of respondent No. 1 and he passed order dated 20.04.2016, through which he held the charges against the appellants as established and ordered confiscation of the goods subject to redemption of those upon payment of 35% of the value of the goods in terms of SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009, imposed penalty of Rs. 200,000.00 on the appellant No. 1 and Rs. 100,000.00 on appellant No. 2, in addition to in addition to the worked out evaded amount of duty and taxes of Rs.2,444,889.00/.

3.Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order-in-original, the appellant filed the instant appeal before this Tribunal on the grounds incorporated in the memo of appeal. The appellant's counsel further argued that on the basis of grounds of appeal and facts, the instant appeal may kindly be accepted and the Order passed by the adjudicating authority may kindly be set aside in the interest of justice.

4.The respondent department has submitted Para-wise comments in reply to the memo of appeal, which are placed on record. The departmental representative further submitted that the Order passed by authority below is correct in facts and law, which is required to be upheld.

5.Heard the arguments, and perused the record and the relied upon documents/judgments by the appellant's. It is felt appropriate for me to first settle the objection of the respondent No. 1 that the instant appeals could not be heard for decision unless the imposed fine and penalty is not paid by the appellant as expressed in section 195-B of the Act and for that an appropriate order may be passed, while dismissing the appeals of the appellants as non maintainable. In this context, it is clarified that Section 195-B of the Act, is directory and permissive in nature, therefore the appeal cannot be dismissed on the basis of non deposit of imposed fine/penalty. The said provision is imperative and obligatory as it uses the word "shall", this word or must are generally considered as mandatory but it is equally well settled that the word "shall" and "may" depending upon the context in which they have been said or often interchangeable as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in reported judgment PLD 1972 SC 326 that "it is now well settled that the words "may" and "shall" in legal phraseology are interchangeable depending on the context in which they are used or not to be interpreted with the rigidity, which is attributed to them in ordinary parlance." Although section 195-B of the Customs Act, 1969 while directing the deposit of amount of duty in respect of goods which are not under the control of customs authority or any penalty levied under this Act uses expression "shall" no consequences are flowing in the expression for non compliance. Another well settled principle of interpretation of statutes became applicable that as the language of section 195-B of the Customs Act, 1969 is in affirmative and not negative, it is deemed to be directory not mandatory as held in reported judgment PLD 1974 Supreme Court 134 Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Rakib that "as a general rule a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but not when those direction are followed up by an expressed provision that, in default of following them the fact shall be null and void. To put it differently if the act is directory its disobedience does not entail any invalidity; if the Act is mandatory disobedience entail serious legal consequences amounting to the invalidity of the act, done in disobedience to the provision. The respondent No. 2 failed to appreciate that the provision of section 195-B has to be read in harmony and in the benefit of the appellant because non payment of imposed penalty least snatch his right of appeal guaranteed under section 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969. Hence, it is appropriate to dispense with the condition of payment of penalty as i.e. proper and just course of action and decide the appeal on merit as right of appeal is an inalienable guaranteed under section 194-A and Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and injunction of Islam beside the said act would had been an act of allowing the appellant a fair trial in terms of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 (18 Amendment). My findings have the validation of reported judgment 1993 MLD 1645, 1993 CLC 1405 and 2005 PTD (Trib.) 731.

6.Prior to dealing with the merits of the case, it is noted with concern that the Adjudicating Authority, for the purposes of imposition of Redemption Fine, has resorted to application of SRO 499(I)/2009 (which has been issued under the Provisos to section 181 of the Customs Act, 1969) despite there being no allegation as to the subject import being violative of section 15 or a notification issued under section 16 of the Customs Act, 1969 or any other law for the time being in force, which requirements clearly have the mandate of law under the referred Provisos to section 181 of the Customs Act, 1969. Such recourse has been had by the Adjudicating Authority without there being any allegation in such regards either narrated in the Show-Cause Notice or, for that purpose, in the Order-in-Original, impugned in the present appeal. In mounting one illegality upon the other, the Adjudicating Authority has also unlawfully fixed the amount of the Redemption Fine to the extent of 35% of the value of the offending goods in spite of the fact that the honourable Sindh High Court in the case of Weave & Knit (Pvt.) Limited (reported at 2004 PTD 2981) and a Division Bench of the Customs Appellate Tribunal in the case of Novo Nordisk Pharma (reported at 2013 PTD (Trib.) 2186) have held that "Customs Value" is to be worked out with reference to the amount of duty/taxes attempted to be evaded and not the value of the "offending goods". In accordance with the word of the law as well as the principle laid down by the honourable High Court of Sindh, as followed by a Division Bench of this Customs Appellate Tribunal, I do not have any difficulty in holding that the manner in which the Redemption Fine has been imposed simply militates against the settled principle, of law and is neither warranted nor sustainable under the law.

7.Reverting to the factual aspects and merits of the case, the appellant's counsel argued that the engine parts for diesel engines, as imported, were for use in the engines of the earth moving machinery and that there was no strength in the departmental allegation that these had been imported for use in the heavy duty vehicle. To such an end, Goods Declarations were produced on the importer's behalf to substantiate that as a matter of long standing practice like and identical goods had been cleared on the basis that these were to be used in the engines of earth moving machinery. In rebuttal, the DR contended that the subject engine parts were for use in the heavy duty vehicles as was established during the adjudication proceedings on the strength of documents furnished by them. Upon being asked as to whether there was any difference between the engines of the earth moving high-powered machinery and those of the heavy-duty automotive vehicles, satisfactory response was not advanced on the respondents' behalf. It was, nevertheless, contended that the appellant importer commercially imported and dealt in engine parts for heavy duty vehicles which fact gave credence to the fact that the subject imported engine parts were to be used in the heavy duty automotive vehicles and not the earth moving machinery.

8.Upon perusal of the operating part of the subject Order-in-Original, it is seen that the documents produced by the appellant, in defending the case made out against them by the officers of the DG I&I-FBR, were not relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority on the basis that these were " .... Photocopies of the leaflets retrieved by the respondents from different websites . " and also as "computer printouts of websites other than the manufacturer and various instructions manuals in Japanese language ..". It is further stated that it was confirmed by the respondent/Detecting Agency that the appellant was the "importer/ trader" of automotive engine replacement parts "for vehicles, including earth moving and other machinery". The Adjudicating Authority did not take into consideration the Purchase/Supply Order as had been issued to the appellant importer for supply of spare parts of construction machinery on the basis that the appellant importer was not able to produce any evidence by way of Sales Tax Invoice duly supported with Sales Tax Return that they ever supplied an identical part(s) to any construction company/contractor for use in machinery in the past. In the same manner the so-called printouts and leaflets from websites were also purportedly not taken into consideration by the Adjudicating Authority on the pretext that the appellants could not put forth any plausible reason and/or arguments to rebut the charges against them when purportedly and allegedly confronted with the original catalogue of the manufacturer.

9.Upon minute examination of what has been stated by the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned Order-in-Original, it is rendered obvious that the appellant importer's two contentions have been given two different and separate treatments. Firstly, the appellant importer's contention that it was an importer of engine replacement parts for vehicles, including earth moving and other machinery was deemed by the Adjudicating Authority to confirm (on account of the use of the word vehicle) that the appellant was the commercial importer of automotive engine replacement parts completely ignoring the fact that the appellant importer had contended that such vehicles also included earth moving and other machinery. Notwithstanding the fact that a quasi-judicial form is not vested with the authority to pick and choose from a party's contention or to interpret it in such manner as is beneficial to the prosecution's case and to discard what is detrimental to it, I also find no justification in the Adjudicating Authority not accepting the Purchase/Supply Order produced by the appellant importer on the pretext that it was not supported by the evidence such as Sales Tax Invoices and Returns as to the past transactions. Once a party, during the adjudication proceedings, has produced documentary evidence as to the legality of its imports then the burden of proof in terms of Sections 156(2) and 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, stands discharged and it is then for the department to prove the party's contentions to be as incorrect, which, in my opinion, was not done in the present case and while the mere use of the word "vehicles" in the appellant importer's pleadings was used against him to treat him as a commercial importer of replacement engine parts of vehicles only but simultaneously the other documents that he produced in aid of his contentions that the subject goods were for use in the construction and other machinery was not even considered on the basis of lack of further documentary evidence in such regards as to the "past transactions". Accordingly, I find no merit and substance in the Adjudicating Authority's finding as to the subject goods being engine replacement parts to be used in vehicles other than the construction and other machinery.

10.In relation to the NPR catalogue, of which there is no mention in the Show-Cause Notice and, therefore, the appellant importer cannot be deemed to be confronted with the same during the adjudication proceedings, the learned DR was specifically asked the question whether the engines used in the construction machinery (excavators, bulldozers, fork-lifters etc.) were any different from those used in the heavy vehicles, trucks and buses, he replied in the negative but asserted that on account of the fact that the appellant importer also dealt in replacement engine part of vehicles, therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that these would indeed be used in the construction machinery. I am not inclined to accept such contention insofar as the classification of any goods is not dependent upon the manner in which these are to be used in the post importation scenario and even otherwise the appellant importer has successfully established the existence of past practice in relation to the subject goods to be cleared under the HS Codes 8409.9999 and 8483.6099. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Radaka Corporation reported at 1989 SCMR 353 has held that a departure from departmental practice following a particular course in the implementation of a rule will be extremely unfair.

11.Besides the above discussed points of utmost importance. It is further matter of facts that the goods were examined under section 198 of the Act and Rule 435 and thereafter the authorities defined in sections 80 and 83 of the Act in exercise of the powers vested upon them through Notification No.371(I)/2002 dated 15.06.2002 passed valid assessment/ clearance orders, meaning thereby the goods were out of charge of Customs. Those could not be detained or seized by either respondent No.2 or his subordinates for the purpose of examination and assessment or even classification, nothing this sort is permissible as it is settled principle of law that after the goods are out of charge the Customs Officials became functus officio. Even otherwise, powers of valuation, classification and assessment are not available to the official of respondent No.2 under SRO. 486(I)/2007 dated 09.06.2007. In case of apprehension of evasion of duty and taxes, the appropriate course available with the respondent No. 2 was to file an appeal under the provision of Section 193 of the Customs Act, 1969 against the assessment orders passed under Section 80 of the Act and Rule 438 of the Rules, incorporating the apprehension and fact of the case and the contravening provision of the Act/Rules. Upon receipt of appeal, the Collector Appeal if observed that the contention of the officials of respondent No. 2 is correct is empowered to issue show-cause notice under the provision of section 32 to the importer/appellant and upon receipt of the reply to the show-cause notice have to pass an order, after perusal of the grounds of appeal and the reply to the show-cause notice. Instead of adopting the correct course of law, the respondents reopened the assessment order under the provision of Section 195 of the Act, under which only Board or Collector is empowered. The respondents reopened the assessment orders by assuming the powers of Collector, which is tantamount to usurpation and renders the detention/seizure/ show-cause notice and Order-in-Original without power, hence, void and ab-initio and of no legal effect. Similarly, neither respondent No. 2 nor respondent No. 1 is empowered to frame contravention report or issue show-cause notice and pass order-in-original under any provision of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, by virtue of the fact that none of them are appointed as officer of Inland Revenue under the provision of sections 30-A and 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and sections 228 and 207 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Resultant insertion of the provision of Sales Tax and Income Tax in contravention report and invoking of those in the show-cause notice is without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect. This lapse is fatal and renders the action right from detention till order-in-original, ab-initio, null and void.

12.It is noted with concern that despite framing of contravention report and issuance of show-cause notice to the appellants under the provision of Section 32(2) of the Act, which speaks about "deliberate act and collusion" none of the Customs Officials of MCC of Appraisement-West, who examined the goods and passed assessment/ clearance orders under the provision of sections 198, 80 and 83 of the Act and Rules 435, 437, 438 and 442 of the Rules, have been charged under the provision of Section 32 despite apparent "deliberate act and collusion" if analyzed with the contravention report, show-cause notice and order-in-original. If the respondents are of the view that none of the officials of MCC of Appraisement-West are involved, it is hard to digest because none of the appellant are allowed to arrange the examination, instead i.e. arranged by the Terminal Operator on the order of Deputy Collector of Customs KICT or his subordinate. Similarly, the assessment order is passed by the appropriate authority independently without any influence either of the appellants. If it is assumed for the sake of arguments that none of the customs officials were involved, in that case Section 32(2) is not applicable and case in question falls within the ambit of "error, omission or misconstruction" attracting the provision of Section 32(3) of the Act, the authority to issue show-cause notice under the said section is Principal Appraiser as enunciated in SRO 371(I)/2002 dated 15.06.2002. To the contrary, in the instant case the show-cause notice and order-in-original have been issued/passed by the Additional Collector. No authority is empowered to assume the powers of his subordinate prescribed for the purpose of adjudication because while performing their duties as quasi judicial authorities they cannot be termed as subordinate to the higher officer and they are quite independent in performing their officials duties as adjudicating officers. This lapse render the show-cause notice and order-in-original without lawful authority and jurisdiction. Hence, ab-initio, null and void.

13.I am also flabbergasted to observe that respondents have charged the appellants for mis-declaration under the provision of section 32(2) of the Act, in the absence of availability of collusion, although this is without any basis, if it is presumed that their exist any collusion, that it could not be with the active connivance collusion of the Officials of MCC of Appraisement-West. Ironically, no charges have been levelled under Section 32(2) against them. I have also noticed that in similar case of M/s. Trading House, Karachi, relating to GD No. KEPW-HC-184947-23052015, contravention report was prepared, which was rejected upon conduction of 2nd examination report, on the basis of which assessment order was passed to the contrary, in the case of appellant contravention was framed for adjudication proceeding despite standing on the same pedestal as of appellant. This act of the respondents proves that the appellant has been met out with partial and different treatment in negation of Articles 4 and 25 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The High Court of Sindh in its reported judgment 2002 PTD 976 held that "vacating the show-cause notice in one case and taking action against another person in similar situation, is amount to discrimination which is hit by Article 25". In reported judgment 2002 SCMR 312 and 2009 PTD 1507 the Hon'ble Superior Courts "there exist no power to target incidence of tax in such a way that similarly placed person be dealt not only this similarly, but discriminatingly". Whereas, in reported judgment 2005 SCMR 492 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "A facility allowed to some one and denied to other is discrimination". The Apex Court further held in reported judgment 2010 SCMR 431 that:

"doctrine of equality, as contained in Art. 25 of the constitution, enshrine golden rules of Islam and states that every citizen, no matter how high so ever, must be accorded equal treatment with similarly situated persons--- State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and make laws applicable only to persons or objects within a class--- In fact all legislations involve some kind of classification whereby some people acquire rights or suffer disabilities whereas others do not--- What however, is prohibited under principle of reasonable classification, is legislation favouring some within a class and unduly burdening others-- Basic rule for exercise of such discretion and reasonable classification is that all persons laced in similar circumstances must be treated alike and reasonable classification must be based on reasonable grounds in given set of circumstances but the same in any case must not offend spirit of Art. 25 of the Constitution."

14.For the foregoing reasons and in the light of prescribed law and evidences, the instant appeal is allowed and I, hold that the subject goods, in terms of description and HS Codes, are to be assessed as per the appellant importer's declaration and consequently the Order-in-Original, impugned by the appellants, and the Show-Cause Notice providing the basis thereof are hereby set-aside with no order as to costs.

15. Order passed and announced accordingly.

HBT/58/Tax(Trib.) Appeal allowed.